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Canada's External Constitution and Its
Democratic Deficit

STEPHEN CLARKSON AND STEPAN

wooo*

One of the international system's most striking developments during the
last half-century is the vast proliferation of international organizations
(IOs). These IOs are generally presented individually as addressing almost
every imaginable policy issue concerning the global public domain, such
as managing international air traffic, dividing up the universal radio wave
spectrum, establishing a law of the sea, or lending to developing countries.
By their very nature, all international phenomena have a domestic incidence. At the same time as they create a transnational sphere of governance, multilateral institutions created by governments necessarily affect
the internal affairs of the signatories, whether this is the pricing of drugs
for their HIV/AIDS victims, the treatment of their Aboriginals, or the size
of their foreign debt and the interest payments they have to make on it.
This chapter argues that the best framework within which to understand Canada's relationship with these evolving instances of global governance is to reframe these IOs in terms of two constitutional expressions of
their collective significance.
First, the steady accumulation of intergovernmental agreements and
organizations has constituted a complex but substantial world order, which
we can best conceptualize as comprising an emerging global constitution.

*

Much of this analysis evolved through our collaboration as virtual professors at the
Law Commission of Canada on the paper "Governing Beyond Borders: Law for Canadians in an Era of Globalization."
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Second, and simultaneously, the global constitution restructures the
legal order of every participating state by adding an external constitution to
its domestic constitution, albeit in varying ways and to different degrees.
These two propositions need both to be amplified by defining constitution and by elaborating the complexities raised by this expanding dialectic reality in which the international has domestic roots and the local has
global effects.
A. DEFINING A CONSTITUTION

A constitution is the set of fundamental rules and institutional practices
according to which any organization-whether a small club or a large
state-governs itself Reduced to its essential features, a constitution
demonstrates four main components. It typically sets out: the guiding
principles that guide the community's collective life; the main rules that
govern members' behaviour; the rights of community members vis-a-vis
governing authorities; and the functions, scope, and limitations of the
collectivity's executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. 1 In the realm
of politics and public law, constitutions are associated almost exclusively
with the nation-state2-an inward-looking understanding that needs to be
supplemented by appreciating how international commitments also affect
the domestic constitutional order. At the same time, as international governance arrangements have become more powerful and pervasive, it has
become plausible to talk about them collectively as giving a constitutional
character to the global community.
B. THE GLOBAL CONSTITUTION

Any consideration of the emerging global constitutional order must preemptively recognize its fragmentary, disconnected, imbalanced, heterogeneous, and multifarious nature. International organizations range in
their territorial scope from bilateral to regional to global, and in their size
from tiny to huge. Some are relatively autonomous, while others are little
more than agents for their member states. Some may be quite insignificant, while others exercise substantial influence over world developments,
1

2

For example, Joel Bakan et aL, eds., Canadian Constitutional Law, 3d ed. (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 2003) at 3- 4; Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West,
1979).
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada, student ed. (Scarborough; ON: Carswell,
2004) at r; Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) at 3.

Canada's Externa/Constitution and Its Democratic Deficit 99

as well as over national governments. They vary from relatively informal
secretariats to bricks-and-mortar organizations with their own buildings,
permanent civil service, insignia, and flags (for example, the UN Development Program). They include ad hoc arrangements for cooperation in a
specific functional area (for example, international fisheries management
regimes) and general-purpose political structures complete with the organs of a would-be world government (the United Nations itself).
The general trend shows that many international institutions enjoy expanding competences in sectors that once were the exclusive domain ofstates.
Beyond enlarging its range, thanks to the formal decisions of their member
states, the global order has acquired some autonomous capacity to evolve. Although typically established by some kind of intergovernmental agreement,
an international organization may take on a life of its own with implications
for its founders. For instance, new rules that bind member states may be
introduced in the course of an international body such as the World Health
Organization (WHO) carrying out its responsibilities. When international
tribunals make judgments to resolve a dispute between two governments,
they often establish new norms that can impact all other countries, however far away. International commissions reach decisions about new problems with significant consequences in member states. For instance, food
safety issues have become burning questions for the once obscure Codex
Alimentarius Commission in Rome. Although highly technical, the questions surrounding the approval or labelling of genetically modified (GM)
foods produced for human consumption involve the fate of many countries'
agricultural economies as well as the profitability of some of the world's largest corporations, which have invested billions to develop seeds impervious to
certain insects or plant diseases. Because of public concerns about the health
implications of hormone-treated livestock and GM fruits· and vegetables,
agribusiness and governments are defending their positions at the Codex
in the face of non-government organizations and experts who represent the
often opposing interests of consumer and producer groups.
In sum, the hugely complex, multi-institutional international order can
be analyzed in terms of the four basic components of a constitutional order.
1. Norms or principles range from the vague (the aspiration for peace)
to the specific (responsibility to protect). This chapter will restrict itself
to such norms governing the economic behaviour of governments as national treatment and most favoured nation.
2 . The rules emitted by IOs are multitudinous but more specific and
forbidding, for example, preventing states from exploiting children. Since
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these rules are negotiated in a power-based process, they naturally reflect
the interests of the dominant powers.
In the economic sphere, a great many of the rules reflect American
norms. When the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
reached an agreement in 1997 on the liberalization of their telecommunications sectors, the US trade representative Marlene Barshefsky exulted
that the United States had just universalized its Telecommunications Act
of 1994 (New York Times, 7 February 1997). The WTO's Trade-Related Aspects oflntellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement supported the interests of American, European, and Japanese big pharma, entertainment,
and information-technology industries, but threatened those of the emerging economies.
3. Rights in the global constitution are generally expressed in very general terms, such as the right to justice or education or shelter.
In the economic side of the global constitution, rights become much
more specific. Many bilateral investment treaties establish the right offoreign
investors not to have their property expropriated by the host government.
4. Institutions can be found that are powerful, well financed, and sophisticated as in the partly supranational, partly intergovernmental, structure created by the various treaties that built the European Union into its
own constitutional order. Other international institutions are quite flimsy.
Whether strong or weak, international institutions can be analyzed as a
global collectivity or as individual institutions in terms of their five principal functions.
a) Legislature. Taken as a totality, world institutions have a spotty and
uneven legislative capacity, because their rule-making record is weak. The
General Assembly of the United Nations is a major global debating forum,
but its capacity to legislate has been contained by the UN's executive, the
Security Council. The European Parliament's mandate has grown but remains inferior to the European Commission's substantial legislative capacity, which manifests itself in the form of hundreds of directives that its
member states are bound to implement.
The WTO was born in 1995 with a vast number of rules already decided as a result of eight years' worth of intergovernmental negotiations.
Its institutional ability to delete, amend, or add new rules takes the form
of the biennial meeting of its members' trade ministers. However, the requirement that WTO decisions be made by consensus makes it extremely
difficult to reach any decision acceptable to all-currently 148-member
.states. As a result, new rules for the WTO are made following years-long
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negotiating "rounds" between the member-governments, as in the current
Doha Round, named for the site of the ministerial meeting that launched
it in 2ooi. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)'s trade
commission has virtually no rule-making authority: any rule changes
must be negotiated by the continent's three states.
b) Executive. Most institutions have an executive group charged with
managing day-to-day operations as well as making critical decisions such
as whether the United Nations should endorse a pre-emptive war against
Iraq. Putting all international organizations together, one of their second
constitutional functions is the executive-largely because nation-states
have been reluctant to allow devolve much decision-making authority beyond their control.
The WTO has no executive to speak of, while-NAFTA's merely consists
of periodic meetings of the three countries' trade ministers.
c) Administration. If it is to operate, an organization needs a staff to
implement decisions and deliver the action for which it is mandated.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
UNESCO, and, of course, the United Nations have personnel totalling in
the thousands. Aggregating them all would show a considerable-but heterogeneous and disconnected-international civil service, many elements
of which are supranational in the sense that their civil servants' careers are
independent of their member governments' control.
The WTO has an extremely lean administration: a mere five hundred
people operate this globally crucial institution. NAFTA has no central administration at all. Each of the three signatory states maintains a small
office to keep track of NAFTA-related paperwork and each federal government assigns civil servants to staff a few working groups that deal with
some ofNAFTA's minor, outstanding business.
d) judiciary. Norms and rules are subject to diverse interpretations.
Administrative actions cause compliance complaints. As a result, no organization can operate for long without having to resolve conflicts generated
by its own mandate, measures, and mechanisms. Dispute settlement varies from the highly structured European Court of Justice, whose rulings
have direct effect in each member state of the EU, to the largely ineffectual
arbitration processes established in the International Labour Organization
(ILO).
As we will shortly see when looking at the domestic impact of global
economic norms and rules, the WTO's and NAFTA's judicial capacities
can have decisive effects.
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e) Enforcement. The European Commission's directives can be enforced

through the rulings of the European Court of Justice, which have direct
effect in the domestic legal system of the EU's member states. By contrast,
the conventions of the ILO are unenforceable except by moral suasion.
Compliance with the WTO's dispute settlement rulings tends to be
high, in large part because its rules permit economic retaliation against
states that do not comply with its judgments. WTO rulings are also effective in part because a member considers it in its interests to comply with
an adverse judgment, on the expectation that its counterparts will comply
when it wins a ruling against their trade protectionism.
This is not the place to develop a more extended analysis of the global
constitution in all its kaleidoscopic components and uneven functioning.
The point of this section is to emphasize that, taken as a whole, existing international organizations create a global governance system which Canada
has to take seriously, and for two reasons.
• First, as an agent in-or subject of-globalization, Ottawa participates in efforts to reform existing elements of the world order and
develop new components as needs arise. Canada may have lost relative position in the global hierarchy of states over the last few decades, declining from being the seventh largest economy to battling
with Brazil for ninth place, but it remains a player in the upper-middle range of semiperipheral states that can make a difference in the
shadow of the more powerful states that bestride the centre of the
world's power system. During the Uruguay Round of negotiations to
reform the GATT, for instance, Ottawa made the original proposal
that led to the new WTO receiving a powerful judicial capacity.
• The second reason why Canadians should take the global constitution
seriously is that, as objects of globalization, their own political system
is significantly affected by having imposed on it what this chapter calls
a supraconstitution-to the explication of which we will now turn.
C. CANADA'S SUPRACONSTITUTIQN3

Because of the many IOs' cumulative domestic impact, the global constitution necessarily impinges on the constitutional order of every member

3

Much of this analysis is adapted from Stephen Clarkson, "Canada's External Constitution under Global Trade Governance," in Ysolde Gendreau, red., Dessiner la societe par
l~ droit/Mapping Society Through Law (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 2004) at I.
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state but to a degree that depends on its inherent power. In this section,
we will focus on the extent to which two international economic institutions-the global WTO and the continental NAFTA-have contributed to
creating an external constitution for Canada.
The main thrust of economically focused regimes established in the
past half-century is the liberation of international trade and investment
from member governments' control. Through global, regional, or bilateral agreements, states commit themselves to dismantling barriers to the
movement of goods, services, and capital (but generally not labour) across
borders; to revoking policies that favour domestic over foreign producers,
goods, or services; and to eliminating all forms of government intervention that distort market competition. All this is implemented in the hope of
reaping the benefits of comparative advantage, more efficient production,
lower prices, and greater consumer choice of goods and services.
Although presented at the time as a commercial agreement, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) 4 was historically significant as a step towards a new global investment regime, with fundamental
implications for the structure of corporate-state relations, and the effective
constitutionalization of an international corporate "personhood" complete
with powerful individual rights.
CUFTA also became a polarizing moment in Canadian politics. On
one side, was the business community, which saw the agreement as necessary to its survival in a world characterized by declining tariff protection
and increasing challenges from competitors exploiting economies of scale
in global markets and minimal labour costs in Third World countries to
achieve lower production costs: On the other side, was a broad coalition
of civil-society organizations led by the labour unions and the women's
movement, which saw CUFTA as a death warrant to the activist state on
whose public services and programs they believed their collective well-being depended.
NAFTA, which was signed in 1993 and came into force in 1994· in
effect continentalized CUFTA's bilateral regime by incorporating Mexico
into its then toughened set of rules. Driven by Washington's demands that
its two neighbours open up their economies by cutting back their governments' controls, NAFTA strengthened CUFTA's investment provisions,
extended its rules on services, and added powerful intellectual property
rights that were of particular importance to American brand-name phar4

CUFTA came into force in 1989.
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maceutical transnational corporations (TNCs). NAFTA partially institutionalized the two peripheral economies' hitherto informal integration as
territorial extensions of the American marketplace. It is worth noting that
NAFTA became almost as divisive in American politics as CUFTA had
been in Canada. Fearing the loss of jobs to Mexico because of that country's low wages and weak enforcement of environmental and labour standards, American environmental organizations and trade unions followed
their Canadian comrades by launching a similarly futile campaign against
the business-led agenda for continental economic integration.
A year after NAFTA had established a continental economic regime, the
long Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations came to a successful end
with the establishment of a new global economic order in the form of the
WTO, which transformed global governance by projecting to the global level
the trade and investment rules wanted for their TNCs by the core capitalist
countries. Taken together, the WTO and NAFTA superimposed on Canada's
already existing internal legal order an external constitution which can in
turn be analyzed in terms of its norms, rules, rights, and institutions.
1) Norms

The WTO and NAFTA establish general principles that are to guide state
behaviour. National Treatment (NT) is a supraconstitutional norm in the
sense that it controls government actions because it has been incorporated
as a superior legal principle in general terms, but not as legislation applying to specific public policies. For instance, there is no Canadian law
saying that the federal government must treat foreign-owned furniture
companies at least as well as it treats Canadian-owned furniture firms .
. But now that these trade agreements have extended the national-treatment
principle from goods to investments and then to services, if any federal or
provincial or municipal government discriminates in favour of a nationally
or provincially owned firm-whether one that manufactures goods or one
that offers services, the government of Canada is liable to legal attack by
another government belonging to NAFTA or the WTO that deems one of
its companies in Canada to have suffered from unequal or discriminatory
treatment. In other words, although not implemented in specific statutory
texts, NT is a supraconstitutional principle on the basis of which NAFTA
partners may litigate.
Along with National Treatment, the Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
norm in GATT's Article I rules out discriminating among trading part-
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ners, even for reasons of social or environmental policy. NT and MFN have
become supraconstitutional along with countless other international commitments that Canada has made by signing, for instance, the many conventions on labour rights sponsored by the ILO. What makes NT. and MFN
more important than other norms in the global constitution is the fact that
they can be enforced, as we will shortly see.
The domestic impact of these supraconstitutional norms is also growing because the judicial interpretation of the WTO's principles has proven
far more expansive and intrusive than that of identical norms had been
u.nder the GATT. Even when government measure~ are formally neutral
vis-a-vis nationality, for instance, the WTO may strike them down if, in
practice, they are deemed to bias competitive conditions in favour of domestic service providers (national treatment) or of particular foreign providers (most favoured nation).S
When trying to assess the democratic implications of a country's suprac9nstitution, it helps to distinguish process legitimacy from outcome legitimacy. The insertion of authoritative new norms into the Canadianpolitical
order raises legitimacy issues, both in terms of process and outcome. The
imposition of major constraints on the capacity not just of the federal, but
also of provincial and municipal governments as a result of a negotiating
process characterized by secrecy and non-transparency took place with a
minimum of informed public debate. This absence .of a democratic deliberation concerning a major shift in the parameters of the political order
contrasts with the extensive engagement not just of the political parties,
the media, and interest groups-the normal actors in a political processbut also of the highest court of the land from 1980 to 1982 when Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau led a campaign to patriate the domestic Canadian
constitution into which he intended to introduce a Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
Normative additions to the Canadian legal order from NAFTA and the
WTO had direct consequences in terms of their outcome legitimacy. National treatment for investment spelled the end to a whole generation of
industrial development policies centred on the targeting of subsidies to
domestic corporations or sectors to improve their competitive performance
in order to boost their exports. It also called into question the capacity of
the ·Canadian state to impose environmental regulations and bolster its
)

Scott Sinclair, GATS: How the WTO's Expanded General Agreement on Trade in Services
Will Erode Democracy (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2000) at 44.
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cultural industries through favouring domestic entities in the private sector. In this way, supraconstitutional norms have had direct, delegitimizing
impacts on the domestic legislative and administrative order without most
of the public-and even much of the government apparatus-understanding this had happened.
2) Rules

When we speak of Canada's external constitution, we also refer to those
rules at the international level that can be said to form part of the ensemble
of fundamental practices by which Canadian society is governed, and from
which domestic Canadian laws and policies may not derogate. Identifying all such rules is bound to be a monumental task, given the hundreds
of international commitments Ottawa has signed. To illustrate the substance of Canada's supraconstitutional rules, we focus on those contained
in CUFTA, NAFTA, and the WTO.
Continental economic integration was paid for by North America's two
weaker partners with diminished political autonomy. While CUFTA and
NAFTA did achieve somewhat reduced American tariffs for Canadian exporters, the price Ottawa had to pay for a partial opening of the US market
was to accept constraints on the Canadian state's regulatory capacity. The
federal government was no longer allowed to manage a two-price system
that supplied petroleum products for domestic industry and consumers
at lower prices than the export price charged to American importers. No
new cultural policies could negatively affect the commercial interests in
Canada of American entertainment corporations.
CUFTA introduced rules reducing Canadian governments' capacity to
regulate investments, whether foreign or domestically owned. Another innovation incorporated in CUFTA was to have trade rules extend far beyond
the rules for buying and selling physical goods by including services, which
cover an enormous range of activities, from those traditionally in the private sector (for example, banking, advertising, engineering, and' tourism)
to those normally provided by governments as public goods (for example,
education, health care, and public utilities). Even if they were not provided
directly by the public sector, many of these services are closely regulated
by governments (including environmental, labour, health and safety, and
consumer protection regulation) and may fall under international rules for
services if th~y have any commercial characteristics that make them competitive with potential foreign providers of the same service.

Canada's External Constitution and Its Democratic Deficit

107

By the very act of signing CUFTA, NAFTA, and the WTO, Canada also
undertook to make immediate changes in a wide range of legislation and
regulations. CUFTA's investment chapter raised the exemption for a review
of a foreign takeover from $5 to $150 million (CUFTA r988). This required
Canadian implementation legislation to make the appropriate amendment
to the Investment Canada Act.
The WTO's and NAFTA's trade principles can also be unde:i.stood as
supraconstitutional because they extend legal protection to foreign corporations-which,. for instance, might consider demands on investors in the
Arctic to be too onerous or the subsidization of only Canadian firms discriminatory. If they do feel aggrieved, they can press their horn~ government to launch a suit against Canada through NAFTA's dispute settlement
panels or the WTO's dispute settlement board. When Canada persisted in
showering public largesse on its champion aircraft builder, Bombardier, to
boost its exports, and Brazil lodged a complaint at the WTO on behalf of its
own regional airplane builder, Embraer, the dispute panel in Geneva found
Canada to have acted illegally. Ottawa was obliged to mend its ways.
While free trade was extremely controversial in the late 1980s, CUFTA's
process legitimacy was actually quite considerable. Although secret, the
negotiation process was the subject of intense media and public interest.
Once the agreement was published, fierce debate over its various provisions continued for months, reaching their climax in the 1988 federal
election campaign whose results-a majority of seats (if only a minority
of votes) for Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative
government-gave the accord an ultimate parliamentary legitimacy. Nevertheless, CUFTA's practical outcome-the loss of hundreds of thousands
of industrial jobs in the Canadian economy's manufacturing centres-left
it highly unpopular among the labour unions and a number of popular
grassroots movements, which continue to deem "free trade" an illegitimate
expression of globalization.
The WTO's and NAFTA's rules are so comprehensive that, in their
implementation legislation, their members had to change hundreds of existing laws. In the WTO's agreement on agriculture, member states committed themselves to transform such quantitative restrictions as import
quotas into tariffs, which were then to be reduced. Canada duly proceeded
to "tariffy" its protective regulations for farmers in central Canada.
Benefiting from much less public debate and information, the process
legitimacy of the WTO's and NAFTA's rules remains dubious. Their out-
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come legitimacy is difficult to assess in any comprehensive way, since the
effects of these rules may take years to become evident.
Previously, changes in laws and regulations were made by governments
within the institutional and legal framework established by their internal
constitutions and in response to demands by .the electorate or by specific
functional constituencies. NAFTA rules are also supraconstitutional in the
sense that the signatory governments have to change their laws and regulations in a context that makes them irreversible. Unlike normal amendments to statutes made by sovereign legislatures, which can further amend
or revoke their acts in response to changing domestic considerations, statutory amendments incorporating international trade norms can be validly
changed only if the external regime changes its rules by international
agreement. What would otherwise be democratically legitimate measures
could subject that government to sanctions or penalties if they are deemed
by the appropriate arbitration procedures to violate the international agreement in question.
In this respect, not only has the political order been changed by the
amendments, but the legal order has been altered by introducing legislative
and regulatory changes over which Parliament no longer exercises sovereignty. This is what free trade's proponents meant when they described
NAFTA as "locking in" neoconservative rules-despite the fact that the
neoconservative model is no closer to being accepted as a sustainable societal contract in Canada than it is elsewhere. 6 Even if more activist political parties were to win power, they would find their hands tied by these
internationally negotiated and domestically implemented political limits
to which their predecessors had committed them.
Another type of rule whose enforcement is contingent on foreign complaints is the prohibition of governments from imposing conditions on
foreign investors, requiring them to make export commitments, to find
local sources for their manufacturing needs, to transfer technology to
domestic partners, or to guarantee set levels of employment.7 To be precise, these standards do not actually prevent governments from imposing
performance requirements on foreign investors or subsidizing domestic

6
7

Tony Clark, Silent C01~p: Confronting the Big Business Takeover of Canada (Toronto: J.
Lorimer. 1997).
Ha-Joon Chang, "Transnational Corporations and Strategic Industrial Policy" in Richard Kozul-Wright & Robert Rowthorn, ed., Transnational Corporations and the Global
Economy (Tokyo: The United Nations University, 1998).
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firms-just as traffic laws do not prevent a motorist from speeding. But
any federal or provincial government that violates these NAFTA or WTO
norms is vulnerable to a partner state initiating a legal action that could
result in economic sanctions to compensate for the damag~ from which its
corporations claim they have suffered.
The global constitution's rule book is never finalized. A chronic state
of flux results from the intergovernmental processes of continually negotiating new global rules. At the WTO's Doha Round, for instance, Canada
was pressed by countries trying to obtain better access to the Canadian
market for their agricultural products. As a result, Ottawa's negotiators
agreed ultimately to abandon both the marketing boards (which guarantee
protection from foreign competitors for chicken, dairy, and egg farmers in
central Canada) and the Canadian Wheat Board (which gets Western grain
farmers the best price on the world market by marketing their wheat collectively). Canada is also under severe pressure from the United States to allow, through raising its commitments to the General Agreement on Trade
in Services, the entry of transnational enterprise into its public health and
education systems. This international context of constant pressure to make
further concessions creates an instability that necessarily puts the external
constitution's legitimacy in continuing jeopardy. If central Canadian farmers realize that their government cannot protect the marketing boards on
which their entrepreneurial calculations depend, their cultural security
vanishes.
3) Rights

The corollary of a limit on government may be a right for the citizen. In
contrast with the EU, which does create direct rights for citizens in member states-for instance to sue their own governments before the European Court of Justice, the only "citizens" whose rights in Canada were
expanded under NAFTA were corporations based in the United States or
Mexico. Under the WTO's Trade Related Investment Measures agreement,
rights were also created for all corporations based in states belonging to the
WTO, not to their citizens. The national treatment principle and the right
of establishment made it easier for firms owned in one country to do business throughout the continent. What makes NAFTA supraconstitutional
in this regard is its creation of a right in Chapter n that gives non-Canadian NAFTA corporations the power to overturn such regulations as those
designed to secure the health and safety of the citizenry by taking member
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governments to international commercial arbitration in alleged cases of
expropriation. 8
CUFTA's Article 1605 provided that no government may "directly or
indirectly expropriate or nationalize," or take "a measure tantamount to expropriation or nationalization" except for a "public purpose," on a "non-discriminatory basis," in accordance with "due process oflaw and minimum
standards of treatment," and on "payment of compensation."9 NAFTA's
Chapter II contained an identical provision. In the face of Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms that deliberately excluded property rights (on the
grounds that they would excessively enhance corporate power which was
already adequately protected by the common law), this provision created a
property right for foreign corporations that was understood neither (apparently) by the government nor (certainly) by the public.
Unlike rights in their internal constitution, this right was not available for Canadian corporations in Canada, where it can only be enjoyed by
American and Mexican companies. The more citizens' groups understood
that foreign corporations had been given invasive rights to nullify domestic
legislation that were unavailable to Canadian enterprise, the more NAFTA's Chapter n became delegitimized, both in terms of its process and
its outcomes. Also contrasting with a national constitution, the new justiciable empowerment accorded to transnational corporations subjects them
to no balancing obligations. For instance, there are no continental-level
institutions with the clout to regulate, tax, or monitor the newly created
continental market that has proceeded to emerge. Io NAFTA's Chapter II expanded the scope of investment rights without requiring TNCs to promote
the public interest by protecting the environment or public health. II

8 Richard C. Levin & Susan Erickson Marin, "NAFTA Chapter n: Investment and
Investment Disputes" (Summer 1996) 83 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the
Americas 82 at 90.
9 CUFTA 1988, Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Article 1605.
ro Stephen Blank & Stephen Krajewski, "U.S. Firms in North America: Redefining Structure and Strategy" (February 1995) 5(2) North American Outlook 9.
II
Steven Shrybman notes that the powerful private enforcement machinery of international investment treaties has now been invoked by several transnational corporations
to assail water protection laws, water export controls, and decisions to re-establish public-sector water services when privatization deals have gone sour. s·ee Steven Shrybman, "The Impact of International Services and Investment Agreements on Public
Policy and Law Concerning Water" (Paper presented at From Doha to Kananaskis: The
Future of the World Trading System and the Crisis of Governance, conference at Ro-
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One minor exception to NAFTA's non-provision of rights to citi,zens is
the process established under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation for citizens to submit complaints challenging any
member government's "persistent failure" to enforce its environmental
laws. However, the mechanism established to investigate these complaints
and the possibilities of enforcing any finding on a delinquent government
are so weak as to be almost meaningless beyond the value of the publicity
and the potential shaming effect that the citizen submission process and
ultimate factual findings might have on a delinquent government. Similarly, the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation established
elaborate mechanisms formally dedicated to facilitating citizens' ·challenging a member government for failing to apply its labour laws. In practice,
trade unions in the three countries have concluded that the scant results
achieved by pursuing the complicated process have not been worth the
expensive efforts needed to pursue a complaint.
Other WTO agreements also contained rights for international corporations but none for citizens, other than investors. Its agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) required that all
member states amend their intellectual property legislation and change
their judicial procedures in conformity with TRIPs' stipulated norms. 12 •
The external and constitutional quality of these rights can be seen in their
giving transatlantic pharmaceutical firms the legal justification to have the
EU successfully take a case to the WTO against Ottawa because its drug
legislation did not give European big pharma the full patent benefits that
they claimed were now their due. 13
4) Institutions

With the major exception of the European Union, whose various institutions' decisions can directly affect the behaviour of its member states'
individuals and corporations, global governance acts indirectly through influencing the behaviour of the nation states that have constructed its vari-

barts Centre for Canadian Studies, York University and Munk Centre for International
Studies, University of Toronto, l-3, 7 March 2002) [unpublished].
12 Christopher Kent, "The Uruguay Round GATT, TRIPS Agreement and Chapter 17 of
the NAFTA: A New Era in International Patent Protection" (1994) IO Canadian Intellectual Property Review at 7n- 33.
13 World Trade Organization, Canada- Term of Patent Protection: Report of the Panel
(Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2000).
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ous organizations. It would be surprising if, in Canada's case, the WTO
and NAFTA would not have some indirect effects on its political institutions as well as their relationship with civil society.
Beyond inhibiting federal and provincial governments' previous capacity for policy action, provincial government powers are deeply affected
by NAFTA and the WTO. For instance, only the federal government may
launch a trade dispute and appear in its hearings, even when a provincial
grievance or measure is the issue. NAFTA and the WTO ·may also have
altered Canadian federalism's relative powers by realigning them between
the two levels of government. By making Ottawa responsible for ensuring
the provinces' conformity to its provisions, NAFTA arguably restored to
the Canadian constitution a federal power of disallowance that had fallen
into disuse. In this way it may possibly alter-to a potentially dramatic degree-the country's delicate constitutional balance.14 NAFTA norms also
create constitutional abnormalities at the level of interprovincial relations.
The application of national treatment and investor-state conflict resolution
to subcentral governments creates the anomaly that provinces, territories,
and municipalities have to give NAFTA investors non-discriminatory treatment, whereas the Canada Constitution Act, 1982 does not prevent them
from discriminating against Canadian investors from other provinces.
Global and continental rules have differing impacts on different parts
of Canadian society. Take the country's two geographically determined
types of agriculture. To the extent that the Prairie Provinces are exporters
of grains and livestock, their farmers can expect to benefit from the WTO's
agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) standards whose supraconstitutional norms limit other states' capacity to use health regulations
to impede imports. As illustrated by the North American dispute with the
European Union over its refusal to allow the import of beef raised with
a growth hormone, the SPS norms, if successfully applied, should make
it easier for Canadian cattle ranchers to expand their export markets. In
contrast, farmers in central Canada- who supply a protected market of
national consumers thanks to the quotas established by government-enforced marketing boards for eggs, milk, and poultry-can be expected to
suffer under the WTO rules as their quantitative barriers are turned into

14 Andrew Petter, "Free Trade and the Provinces" in Marc Gold & David Leyton-Brown,
eds., Trade-Offs on Free Trade: The Canada-U. S. Free Trade Agreement (Toronto: Car-

swell, 1988) at 141-47.
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tariffs, which are subsequently cut to allow more foreign competition in
the Canadian market.
An efficient public health system has become a defining characteristic of Canadians' sense of national identity. If the privatization of publicly
provided services is the product of the services provisions in NAFTA and
the WTO's GATS (the General Agreement on Trade in Services), Canadian society may risk losing a prime social institution that has played a
major role in defining its identity and so threatening its cultural security. 15
Should the impact of continental and global free trade norms cause" the
accelerated commercialization of health care with consequently increased
inequality in the treatment of rich and poor, a central element of Canadian
political culture will have been jeopardized. In this scenario, the external
constitution's democratically inaccessible rule-making institutions would
not just be of dubious process legitimacy in themselves but would help
delegitimize the country's domestic political outputs.
Instead of developing its social and community cohesion, Canada appears to be polarizing into a society of those who can succeed in the globalized system and a society of those left behind. If this perception is linked
to the norms and practices of global and continental governance regimes,
serious repercussions may be felt in the legitimacy of the country's own
representative system. 16 If the external constitution has "hollowed out" the
institutions of the Canadian state to the point that it risks being seen as incapable of defending its citizens' interests, 17 the Canadian political system will
lose credibility at the same time as neoconservative globalization loses legiti·
macy. Much hangs on the capacity and effects of judicial rulings concerning
the conformity of domestic regulations with the supraconstitution.
5) Adjudication

For a foreign government to litigate a case against Ottawa presumes that
global governance boasts adequate judicial capacity. This ability on the
15 Arup writes that "the main thrust of the GATS is deregulatory: it attacks non-conforming national government measures." See Christopher Arup, The New World Trade
Organization Agreements: Globalizing Law Through Services and Intellectual Property

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 96.
16 Stephen McBride & John Shields, Dismantling a Nation: The Transition to Corporate
Rule in Canada, 2d ed. (Halifax: Fernwood, 1997)·
17 Harry Arthurs, "The Hollowing Out of Corporate Canada?" in Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Globalizing Institutions: Case Studies in Social Regulation and
Innovation (London: Ashgate, 2000).
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part of one state to pursue another for violating some supraconstitutional
norm varies widely depending on the IO's own constitution. Global environmental, human-rights, and labour governance is notably bereft of adjudicatory sinew. The strength of global economic norms, rules, and rights
is due to the muscularity of the WTO's dispute-settlement mechanisms.
Whereas the WTO was endowed with an impressive apparatus for adjudicating intergovernmental disputes, NAFTA was created without a supranational judiciary. Instead, North American governance is distinguished by
some precarious dispute-settlement processes whose supraconstitutional
impacts vary from minor (for general disputes between member states)
to negligible (for trade disputes between exporting a~d importing states)
to substantial (for disputes between transnational corporations and host
states).

a) NAFTA
i) Chapter 20: General Disputes
Continental dispute settlement was meant to depoliticize conflicts between
the three governments through having their differences resolved by neutral arbitrators applying common rules. In this spirit, NAFTA's Chapter
20 provides for bi-national panels to be struck when the member states
have been unable to resolve their differences related to issues generated by
the agreement. Although Chapter 20 dispute settlement was considered
expeditious at first, 18 later decisions have proven unable to settle conflicts
without resort to power politics. 19 For example, when it lost a panel decision to Canada in a wheat case, 20 Washington responded by threatening
to launch an investigation into Canadian wheat exports. Closure was only
achieved when US pressure caused the Canadian government to give way
by agreeing to limit wheat exports dur ing 1994-95 to r.5 million tons.zr If
such Chapter 20 rulings are unable to constrain the continental hegemon,
it becomes futile for its neighbours to submit general issues to NAFTA

18 William J. Davey, Pine and Swine (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 199 6) at
65.
19 Vilaysoun Loungnarath & Celine Stehly, "The General Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization
System: Is North American Regionalism Really Preferable to Multilateralism?" (2000)
34 J. World T. 43.
20 Interpretation of Canada's Compliance with Article 7oi.3 with respect to Durum wheat
sales, (1993), CDA-92-1807-01 (Ch. 18 Panel).
21 Davey, Pine and Swine, above note 18 at 65.
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arbitration. Continental governance then gets delegitimized, being unable
to deliver for its weaker members the rights for which they "paid" when
negotiating the original compact. In this respect, the judicial function of
NAFTA is faulty as an aspect of North American governance because it
fails to have supraconstitutional effect in the US legal order.

ii) Chapter 19: Trade disputes
Had NAFTA created a true free trade area, its members would have abandoned their right to impose anti-dumping (AD) or countervailing duties
(CVD) on imports coming from their partners' economies. In their place,
problems of predatory corporate behaviour would have been dealt with by
establishing continentwide antitrust and competition policies. The United
States refused such a real levelling of national trade barriers that would
have created a single continental market. It simply agreed to cede appeals
of its trade-protectionist rulings to bi-national panels that were restricted
to investigating whether the administration's AD or CVD determinations
properly applied domestic trade law. 22
Written into NAFTA's Chapter r9, this putatively binding judicial expedient turned out to be almost as disappointing as its critics had predicted.
When the United States' CVD action against Canadian softwood lumber
exports was remanded for incorrectly applying the notion of subsidy as
defined in US law, Congress simply changed its definition of subsidy to
suit the Canadian situation. Beyond softwood lumber's long-lasting evidence, 2 3 Canada has not had a satisfactory experience in using Chapter
r9 to appeal other American trade determinations. In 1993, for instance,
there were multiple remands in five cases, which led the panels to surpass
their deadlines significantly. Furthermore, problems have arisen over the
lack of consistency in Chapter 19 panel decisions, which have shown differing degrees of deference to agency decisions. 24 Although AD and CVD
jurisprudence may have been ineffective in helping the peripheral states
constrain their hegemon, the opposite is not necessarily true. Canadian
trade agencies have had to become more attentive to American interpretations of the standards they apply in AD or CVD determinations out of a

Leon Trakman, Dispute Settlement under the NAFTA (New York: Transnational, 1997)
at 277.
23 Robert Howse, "Settling Trade Remedy Disputes: When the WTO Forum Is Better
Than the NAFTA" (June 1998) C.D. Howe Institute Commentary III at 15.
24 Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 2d ed. (New
York: Routledge, 1999) at 83.
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concern for what the bi-national panels, which necessarily include American jurists, may later decide on appeal.
Thus Chapter I9 confirms the experience of Chapter 20, that NAFTA's
judicial function is asymmetrical in its impact. On the one hand, it does
not have supraconstitutional clout over the hegemon's behaviour. On the
other, it is used to enforce NAFTA rules in the periphery where it has some
effect on Canadian administrative justice. However, when these processes
don't satisfy Washington, it can still exercise its raw power to achieve its
objectives.

iii) Chapter 11: Investor-State Disputes
With NAFTA's Chapter II, Canada constricted the authority of its national
courts by accepting the jurisdiction of private international arbitration
when American (or Mexican) corporations claim that action (or inaction) by
a federal, provincial, or municipal government has an effect "tantamount
to expropriation" of their property. (By the same token, of course, Chapter
II also gives Canadian companies the right to sue US or Mexican governments.) Although barely noticed when NAFTA was debated in the public
domain before its ratification, a then obscure dispute mechanism has established a powerful new zone of adjudication to enforce Article IIro.'s corporate rights. Under these investor-state tribunals, American (or Mexican)
corporations with interests in Canada can initiate arbitration proceedings
on the grounds of expropriation against a municipal, provincial, or federal
policy that harms their interests. These "investor-state" disputes are taken
for arbitration before an international panel operating by rules established
under the aegis of the World Bank's International Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other
States, or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law for
settling international disputes between corporations. 2 5 Since these forums
operate according to the rules and procedures of international commercial
law, Chapter II disputes actually transfer the adjudication of disputes over
government policies from the realm of public law to commercial law.26

25 Gary Horlick & F. Amanda DeBusk, "Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Building on
the U.S.-Canada FTA, GATT and ICSID" (1993) 27 J. World T. 21 at 52 .
26 For example, in the Metalclad case, the tribunal ruled that the local municipality had
exceeded its constitutional authority- a judgment that hitherto only the judges of the
Supreme Court of Mexico had the power to make. Patrick Dunberry, "The NAFTA
Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Review of the Latest Case Law" (March
2 001) 2 Journal of World Investment 15r.
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Written by trade law specialists in closed hearings with virtually no
opportunity for public input, Chapter II panel decisions have taken a fairly
broad view of what is "tantamount to expropriation" and what counts as
"property," going well beyond what is considered an impermissible taking
in Canadian law and effectively restricting governments' ability to regulate
transnational capital in what they see as the public interest. Since Chapter
II allows American TNCs to take legal action directly without having to
wait for their government to initiate arbitration proceedings, these firms
gain the ability to short-circuit what may be lengthy diplomatic negotiations when they consider themselves to have been subject to abuse in the
neighbouring jurisdiction as well as to avoid having to make their case in
domestic tribunals where the pleadings would be more transparent and
the rulings subject to appeal before superior courts. The threat of an adverse Chapter n ruling is sometimes enough to prompt Canadian governments to repeal offending laws without waiting for a decision (as was the
case when the Canadian government rescinded its ban on the suspected
neurotoxin, the gasoline additive MMT) . The result of the various Chapter
II cases that have been decided is the public awareness that TN Cs from the
US or Mexico have greater rights vis"a-vis the Canadian government than
do domestic Canadian corporations or citizens.
Chapter II arbitrations both shrink the scope of the Canadian judicial
system and overlay it with supraconstitutional processes that conflict with
many of its historic values.

• Transparency is the first victim in this secret world of commercial
arbitration: even the existence of a case may be kept secret, and the
public may never learn what has happened or why.
• Neutrality is the second legal value that falls by the wayside. Since the
plaintiff investor has the right to appoint one of the three arbitrators,
the defending government already faces a bench that is substantially
weighted in favour of corporate rather than public values.
• judicial sovereignty is a third victim of this extraordinary addition to
the Canadian legal order. As the corporate plaintiff and the defendant state choose the panel's chair by consensus, it is likely that there
will be just one Canadian in tribunals adjudicating suits launched
against federal, provincial, or municipal governments' policies.
With its intrusive judicial institutions, this dynamic continental economic regime creates new levels of uncertainty for domestic governments
whose elected officials cannot be sure how measures they propose to im-
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plement might be judged in some future trade tribunal. Many critics of
the new external constitution have talked about a "regulatory chill," particularly in light of NAFTA Chapter II rulings on environmental matters
that have given complaining businesses the benefit of the doubt and shown
little deference to democratically-sanctioned government regulations. This
suggests that, when a norm of international corporate law comes into conflict with a Canadian legal standard, the latter is likely to be overridden by
the former to the profit of transnational corporate autonomy and with the
decline in legitimacy of global economic governance in the public's eyes . .
b) The WTO

In contrast with NAFTA's judicial processes, which are weak at the governmental level and strong at the corporate level, the WTO's dispute settlement body excludes corporations from directly using its services and gives
governments a powerful tool with which to enforce the global regime's economic rules even against the most powerful non-compliant state. Indeed,
the key to the WTO's singular importance lies in the power and neutrality
of its dispute-settlement mechanisms. Unlike NAFTA's Chapter 19 and
20 panels, WTO panelists are chosen from countries other than those involved in a particular dispute. Their rulings are not based on the contenders' own laws, as they are in NAFTA's AD and CVD cases but on the WTO's
international rules. They make their judgements quickly on the basis of
the WTO's norms that they interpret in the light of the international public
law developed by prior GATT jurisprudence.
The composition of its panels enhances the WTO's legalistic rigidity.2 7
Panelists adjudicating WTO di~putes are either trade lawyers and professors of international law who tend to stick very close to the black letter of
the WTO's texts they are interpreting, or they are middle~level diplomats
who take their cues from the Secretariat's legal staff. In either case, they
know full well that their judgment will be appealed by the losing side and
that the judges on the Appellate Body will be responding to highly refined
legal reasoning. 28

27 J.H.H. Weiler, "The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats' Reflections on the
Internal and External Legitimacy ofWTO Dispute Settlement" (zoor) 35 J. World T.

191 at 194·
28 Raj Bhala, "The Myt h About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law" (1999) 14 Am .
U. Int'l L. Rev 845 at 847; David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, "The WTO Legal
System : Sources ofLaw" (19 98) 92 Am . J. Int'l L. 398 at 405.
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While WTO Appellate Body rulings are not formally precedent-setting,
it is generally recognized that the logic of one panel's decision can be carried over from case to case as the situation dictates. Palmeter and Mavroidis
also note that the Appellate Body "operates on a 'collegial' basis. While only
three of the seven members sit on any one 'division' to hear a particular appeal, and the division retains full\authority to decide the case, views on the
issues are shared with the other Appellate Body members before a decision
is reached. Consequently, members of the Appellate Body, in confronting
prior decisions, are far more likely to be confronting their own legal logic,
or that of their close colleagues, than are WTO panellists. This relationship
seems likely to lead to a stronger attachment to the reasoning and results
of those decisions."2 9 Under these conditions, "soft" arguments defending cultural autonomy or environmental sustainability hold little weight
against the "hard" logic of the WTO's rules.
While the WTO's rules create new supraconstitutional norms for member states to accept, their meaning cannot be anticipated with any certainty.
In referring to one contentious concept in trade law, the WTO's Appellate
Body memorably compared the notion of"likeness" to "an accordion, which
may be stretched wide or squeezed tight as the case requires." This judicial
flexibility did not guarantee cultural sensitivity, as Canadians discovered
when the WTO ruled that Sports Illustrated Canada (though filled with
American content) was "like" Maclean's magazine (which was written by
Canadian journalists for a Canadian readership).3° This judgment meant
that several key policy instruments, which had successfully promoted a Canadian magazine industry for several decades, were declared invalid.31 The
permanent threat ofa WTO court challenge of their regulations means that
national policy-makers can only be sure that they will never know what this
supreme court of commercial law will decide until a trade dispute concerning this policy is heard.32
As any student of federalism knows, a system containing more than
one order of jurisdiction creates conflicts between the cohabiting authori29 Palmeter & Mavroidis, ibid.
30 World Trade Organization, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals: Ruling
by the Appellate Body (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1997).
31 Daniel Schwanen, "The Summer of Our (Canadian) Content: Thinking About Canada's Response to the WTO Magazine Decision" (29 June 1998) C.D. Howe Institute
Backgrounder at 29.
32 Robert Howse & Donald Regan, "The Product/Process Distinction-An Illusory Basis
for Disciplining Unilateralism in Trade Policy" (2000) II Eur. J. Int'l Law 249 at 268.
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ties. Whether the WTO rulings' supraconstitutional superiority over their
own constitutional norms will be accepted by Canadian courts remains to
be seen. No case has yet been brought to Canada's Supreme Court to test
whether a ruling by a global or continental dispute panel takes precedence
over a Canadian norm)3 The introduction of a supraconstitution with judicial
muscle suggests that continuing clashes between the external and internal
constitutional orders must be expected. If, as further global limits on government are negotiated in the Doha Round, the federal government agrees
to let education and health care be brought under the aegis of the GATS, it
would affect the provincial constitutional order more than the federal. This
action might also be of dubious constitutional validity since it would lead
to a change in the norms governing the provinces without the appropriate
amendment having been made in Canada's internal constitution.
Conflict can also be anticipated between the global and continental
orders. The United States, for instance, challenged Canada's tariffication
of its agricultural quotas as a violation of its NAFTA obligations.34 The
NAFTA panel ruled that the WTO's tariffication imperative prevailed.35
Other conflicts between the two regimes' norms are bound to occur, complicating their constitutionalizing impact on their members.
The WTO's dispute-settlement system may be superior to NAFTA's in
many respects, but multilateralism does not necessarily present Canada
with a real escape from US pressure. Indeed; much of the constraint that
the WTO imposed on the Canadian state in the first few years of its existence was an application of US-driven demands that Canada comply with
US-inspired WTO rules on behalf of US-based pharmaceutical and entertainment oligopolies.
The judicialization of trade rules has affected international cooperation
on regulation in other areas, such as the environment. Before 1990, many
governments, including Canada's, considered trade sanctions a legitimate
tool for enforcing multilateral environmental agreements and pushed for
their inclusion in such agreements. These governments (and many supportive NGOs and business groups) wished to apply the "teeth" of the trade
33

A constitutional challenge launched by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers and the
Council of Canadians to NAFTA's Chapter n investor-state arbitration process is working its way through the Ontario court system and may ultimately land in the Supreme
Court of Canada for resolution.
34 Trebilcock & Howse, Regulation of International Trade, above note 24 at 267.
35 In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain US-Origin Agricultural Products
(1996), CDA-95-2008-01 (Arbitral Panel).
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regime to the enforcement of environmental treaties. They achieved a breakthrough in 1987 with the Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances,
which allowed member states to impose general trade sanctions against other
member states that violate their obligations under the Protocol. Ten years
later, when states were negotiating the Kyoto Protocol on climate change,
the Canadian and many other governments had reversed their position and
actively opposed the inclusion of trade sanctions as an enforcement tool in
the agreement. Few governments will now openly support the use of trade
sanctions in multilateral environmental agreements. The conclusion of the
WTO agreements in 1994 led many governments, which were unwilling to
take the risk of adverse trade rulings, to fear that the use of trade sanctions to
· enforce multilateral environmental agreements may violate their trad~-law
commitments. In this way international trade rules have taken primacy over,
and inhibit more robust action to enforce, international rules in other areas,
such as environmental protection. These other areas are thus denied the
legal and political "teeth" reserved for the rules of economic globalization.
6) Enforcement

As with other trade treaties, NAFTA has no enforcement capacity other
than the parties' sense of their long-term self-interest. If one member state
does not comply with the judgments that it loses, it cannot expect its partners to do the same. Under the extreme asymmetry prevailing in North
America, the hegemon is largely unconstrained by such prudential considerations. The United States remains able to flout the trade agreements'
rules as interpreted by its judicial processes, something that Washington
has repeatedly done with both Canada and Mexico.
Like NAFTA, the WTO has no police service capable of implementing
its judicial decisions. But unlike NAFTA, the enforcement provisions supporting its dispute settlement rulings are significantly stronger.36 Once
the final decision on a trade dispute has been handed down in which a signatory state's laws or regulations have been judged in violation of a WTO
norm, the offending provisions are supposed to be changed by the defendant or compensation paid to the plaintiff state. A non-compliant state is
36 Ostry called the DSU "the strongest dispute settlement mechanism in the history of
international law." See Sylvia Ostry, "The Future of the World Trading System: Beyond
Doha" in John J. Kirton and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance (Aldershot and
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004).
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much more likely to be brought to "justice" by a litigant state because failure to abide by a WTO dispute ruling gives the winning plaintiff the right
to impose retaliatory trade sanctions against the disobedient defendant.
This retaliation can block any exports of the guilty state. The amount of
the damage inflicted by the retaliation can equal the harm caused to the
complainant by the violation. This self-enforcement system works better
in the WTO where there is greater symmetry among the major powers,
confirming that the global economic regime has a far more substantial
supraconstitutionality for its members in its judicial dimension than does
the regional NAFTA.37
The global constitution has an uneven incidence, depending on the size
of the state. The weaker it is, the more difficult it is to resist. For smaller
countries on the periphery of the world power system, financial organizations-notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank-have unapologetically and even dictatorially impinged directly on
the internal policies of their weaker members, insisting that they radically
restructure their governments. Having well-governed financial institutions-and long experience in floating its currency-Canada has not been
subject to the humiliation of these enforced disciplines.
It has, however, been the object of a process of external oversight that
keeps the Canadian state's behaviour under transnational scrutiny. The
United States Trade Representative's Office keeps federal and provincial
policies under regular review, reporting annually to Congress about Canadian compliance with the obligations it assumed in NAFTA and the
WTO. The WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism reviews Cana'da's policies every two years. This surveillance mechanism presses Ottawa to ever
greater transparency before the epistemic community of trade liberalizers
in conform.ity to their neoconservative ideology. At these encounters, Canada's trading partners cannot force it to make changes, but they ask about
governmental measures that interfere with their investments or trade and
so put Canada's governing elite on the defensive if it is caught practising
discrimination.

37 Robert Howse, "The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel-A Dangerous Precedent in
Dangerous Times" (July 2000) 3 Journal of World Intellectual Property at 493-508.
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E WHAT TO DO?

That the multilateral institutions of global governance are currently facing a significant set of challenges, or even a crisis, has by now become a
relatively uncontroversial point of departure. In many accounts, this crisis
of legitimacy centres on the processes of decision making in multilateral
institutions, which remain largely state-driven and shielded from direct
input from or accountability to citizens and non-governmental organizations. The crisis label also refers to widespread concern about the lack of
substantive fairness of the policies adopted by these multilateral institutions, which are seen as contributing to the exacerbation of inequalities
in the world economy between the richer countries of the North and the
poorer countries of the South. While most agree that a crisis is being faced
and even that it involves questions of the multilateral economic institutions' perceived legitimacy and accountability, there is no consensus on
how to respond.3 8
As with domestic constitutional borders, the supraconstitution is not
a fixed entity but one that is constantly evolving as new rules are negotiated and judicial decisions are made by international trade and investment
dispute settlement. The malleability of the country's external constitution
raises a question about whether Canada should attempt to change it as a result of deliberate, proactive intervention. In other words, to the extent that
Canada is an agent of globalization, what should be its program of action?
The answer to this question depends both on assessing the global constitution's strengths and weaknesses and on defining Canada's national interest. In the view of many, the global order's excessively powerful economic
norms and institutions serve the interests of the major powers and their
transnational corporations. They may even perpetuate the vicious circles
that keep the poor in poverty by denying them the very policy tools, such as
the tariffs and industrial subsidies, that big powers used in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries to industrialize their own economies. The corollary weakness of transnational governance is to be found in the other institutions of the global constitution, principally the IOs defending human,
labour, and ecological rights.

38 Ruth Buchanan & Andrea Long, "Contested Global Governance: States, the World
Trade Organization, and Global Civil Society" (Report prepared for the Law Commission of Canada "Governance Relationships in Transition" Program, December 2 002) r.
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Recommendation: Twenty years ago, a similar study to this one could well

have recommended that the government of Canada establish a full inventory of the country's international obligations to be used as an essential tool
by its own policy-makers, by judges working in the judicial system, and
for the general public's enlightenment. Now that NAFTA and the WTO
have given international economic agreements supraconstitutional weight,
what is even more urgently needed is a constantly updated document that
details exactly what comprises Canada's external constitution.
While the implications of many of its norms, rights, rules, and institutions remain unclear, public officials as well as the general public, business
people as well as civil society organizations need to have just as authoritative information about their external legal order as they do about the Canada Constitution Act, 1982. While most citizens will not know or care about
most of their domestic constitution, accurate information becomes critical
to them when an issue becomes significant-rights for same-sex couples,
for instance. Similarly, vast areas of the country's external obligations are
oflittle interest either to officials or citizens, who need nevertheless to have
access to authoritative information when the need arises.
Recommendation: Following this analysis, Canada should strive to re-

balance the global constitution in order to bolster weak environmental,
labour, and human rights by giving them equivalent weight to its already
robust economic rights.
If Canada's external constitution is not to become a source of political
illegitimacy in its domestic politics, Ottawa must move both to bring transparency to this largely hidden reality and to join with other like-minded
countries in rebalancing the evolving norms and institutions of global
governance. While the Departments of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade must play the lead role in the latter endeavour, the Department of
Justice has the responsibility to deal with the former.

